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To everything there is a season . . .
A time to plant, and a time to pluck up
that which is planted ...
What profit hath he that worketh in that
wherein he laboureth?
Ecclesiastes 3, v. 1,2,9.
The study on which this paper is based is set out to assess the
nature and strength of the link between recent changes in agricultural
technology and employment in South Africa. Amongst its objectives were
to determine
the degree to which mechanisation has occurred on maize farms in
recent years,
how the labour process has changed,
- changes in the level of employment and the characteristics of farm
workers,
- the causes of mechanisation,
and whether any decline in employment has led to a rise in un-
employment.
From the findings, it was possible to make a number of deductions
about changes in the geographical distribution of the population and
in the incomes of farm workers and their families.
1. RESEARCH METHOD
In February-March 1982, a survey was conducted of sixty one maize
farms in six magisterial districts of the Western Transvaal: Coligny,
Delareyville, Koster, Lichtenburg, Schweizer-Reneke and Wolmaransstad
(see Figure 1.). Maize production almost certainly generates consid-
erably more employment than any other branch of agriculture in South
Africa, and the Western Transvaal, in most years, produces more maize
than any other region. Information was gathered about harvesting,
delivery of the harvest and weeding for the years 1968-81. In 1968,
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these were the last three tasks for which large numbers of seasonal
workers were still employed.
It was not possible to select farms on a statistically random
basis. The sample was therefore non-random. By watching its character-
istics in terms of farm size and geographical distribution as closely
as possible to those of the overall population recorded in censuses,
it is hoped that the degree of sampling error has been reduced to
acceptable levels.
The most significant source of sampling error is likely to have
been the over-representation of very large farms and the under-rep-
resentation of very small farms in relation to census data. The
probable direction of bias is therefore towards an over-estimate of
the degree of mechanisation and a corresponding under-estimate of
employment. However, there is no obvious reason to suppose the degree
of error to be gross.
One of the more important potential sources of non-sampling error
arises from what one could call 'class bias1. Because all the data
were collected from farmers, they could consciously or unconsciously
have been biased in favour of capital. The ideal would have been to
interview both farmers and workers. On farms, this was generally not
possible, and might have been counter-productive. But the off-
residence of seasonal workers - out of season - made it easier to
interview them. A second, smaller and less formal survey was under-
taken in the Transkei, partly with the intention of assessing the
degree of non-sampling error. Seasonal workers employed in 1981 and
in previous years on four of the farms visited, were interviewed, and
the same questions concerning inter alia employment and the payment of
wages were asked. Quite without prompting, most of the answers bore a
close resemblance to those given by their employers. While these four
farms represent only about six percent of the total, the corroboration
received does suggest that the error resulting from class bias is not
serious.
The stability of the sample - which depends on the sample size -
should be reasonable since the number of farms included always
represented one percent or more of the population.
In analysing the data, four years - 1968, 1973, 1977 and 1981 -
spread at more or less equal intervals were focused on.
2. CHANGES IN THE TECHNOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF FARMING
2.1 HARVESTING TECHNOLOGY
Harvesting maize involves both reaping - that is, picking the
"head" or "blaarkop" from the stalk - and threshing, or removing the
seeds from the head. Both can be done by hand or mechanically but it
is many years since maize was last threshed by hand in the Western
Transvaal. The basic alternatives are therefore: reaping by hand and
threshing mechanically - called "hand-harvesting" - or reaping and
threshing with the same machine, i.e. "combine-harvesting". In both
cases a number of variations are possible.
Until twenty five years ago, all maize was reaped by hand. Hand
reapers walk down the rows breaking the heads loose from the stalks
and putting them into a container which they carry with them. The
work is tiring and makes heavy demands on one's whole body.
that UJ-UJ. neveA
Typically, a team of seasonal workers, anything between ten and two
or three hundred strong, is employed to reap. The tractors and
trailers used to transport the "blaarkoppe" from the fields to the
threshing machine, vary in number between one and a small fleet and
are driven by permanent workers.
To operate a threshing machine, two men are needed to feed the
"blaarkoppe11 into the hopper - a dirty and tiring job - and one to
control the tractor .hich powers the machine.
The combine-harvesters which appeared in South Africa in the 1950s
presented farmers, for the first time, with a choice between fund-
amentally different harvesting techniques. The first generation
of combines were pulled by tractors and like threshing machines took
their power from the propeller shaft of the tractor. For this reason
they are often called "PTO" (power take-off) combines. By comparison
to the later self-propelled combines, they are simple, robust, re-
liable, well-suited to smaller farming units, and relatively inexpens-
ive, so it is not surprising to find that the majority of combines
currently in use in the Western Transvaal are still of this type.
In the late 1960s a second important change in the range of har-
vesting techniques occurred with the marketing of the first self-pro-
pelled ("SP") combines. These, as the name implies, were no longer
drawn by tractors but were equipped with their own engine. They also
had a considerably greater intake capacity which made it possible to
harvest the same area with fewer machines and drivers. But relative
to PTO combines, they are more complex, temperamental, suited to
larger farming units and expensive to buy and maintain. The mechan-
ical process is similar for both types of combine, and the threshed
grain is collected in a tank in the combine which is emptied periodic-
ally by auger into a truck or trailer.
Opinions vary as to the relative efficiency of combines and
hand-harvesters, but even farmers most convinced of the superiority of
machines still employ seasonal workers to supplement them. Gleaning -
that is, picking up the "blaarkoppe" left behind the combine - is
almost universal.
At a stroke, combines have eliminated much of the toil and grime of
the harvest season. Gone is hand reaping, and gone is the handling of
"blaarkoppe" in transport and threshing. But gone too are most of the
jobs. For seasonal workers, generally, only employment in gleaning
remains - where, though the work is less arduous, the number of jobs
is far smaller. Also, with the change from hand harvesting to
gleaning, it has been possible to replace men with children. Women
have always made up the greatest part of seasonal teams.
At the start of the data-collection period, in 1968, between twenty
five and thirty percent of the area planted with maize was being
harvested by combine. By the end of the period, in 1981, this had
risen to about ninety five percent. The greatest part of the
change-over took place between 1973 and 1977. The most popular
machine used was the smaller, tractor-drawn combine. (See Figure 2
below.)
2.2 DELIVERY TECHNOLOGY
The farmer' s final task is to deliver his crop to a co-operative
depot. There are two ways in which this may be done: in sacks or in
bulk.
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If the crop has been reaped by hand, it is passed through a thresh-
ing machine and emerges from an outlet chute into sacks. When a sack
has been filled, the flow is cut off momentarily, by closing the
chute, and the full sack is removed and replaced by an empty one.
All delivery sacks nowadays hold 70kg of maize, though in days gone
by, the standard weight was 2001b (90kg). When a bag is full it
should contain about 70kg, but the exact weight needs to be checked
before it can be sea1 ed. So from the threshing machine or trailer
sacks are moved to a scale and are topped up or emptied a little as
need be. With the weight correct, they are sewn closed, ready for
loading onto a truck or trailer.
Handling 70kg sacks is not an easy task, especially when it has to
be done all day and sometimes well into the night. Only young,
able-bodied men are employed to do this. Normally four men - one at
each corner of the sack - are assigned to loading, and another two on
the truck itself for stacking and helping with unloading at the depot.
Even for moving the sack from the threshing machine to the scale, two
are needed, and another two to move it off and seal it. So usually at
least ten men would be involved in the delivery process at the
farmer's end. Then, of course, each truck or tractor towing a trailer
needs a driver, and, unless the farm is small, two or more vehicles
are used to ply between the threshing machine and the depot.
At the depot the sequence is : weighing the trailer with its full
cargo, sampling the delivery for grading, off-loading, weighing the
empty trailer, the stacking. So the same heavy job of shifting the
sacks by hand has to be performed twice over again. For these tasks,
workers from farms are joined by a team from the depot.
From the point of view of workers delivery in bags represents a
substantial number of jobs: from the point of view of farmers, on the
other hand, it is a time-consuming and expensive operation. It is not
surprising, therefore, that since the early 1960s, co-operatives in
the Western Transvaal have invested millions of rands in bulk handling
and storage facilities, though other reasons such as prolonging
storage life were also important. The towering concrete silos that
one can see from so far away in the flatness of the Western Transvaal
are the most obvious manifestation of these.
Handling and storing grain in bulk certainly substitutes a
realtively simple process for a more complicated one. On farms the
output of the threshing machines or combine is allowed to flow
directly into a bulk trailer. Hand-labour is required only to spread
the flow evenly with a shovel. The need for filling and weighing each
individual sack is eliminated, not to mention the sweat of handling
thousands of sacks.
At the depot, the weight of the load is again determined by weigh-
ing the entire truck or trailer, first fully loaded and then empty.
Off-loading is simply a matter of stopping the trailer on top of a
grid below which is the hopper for the silo's grain elevator, letting
down the sides of the trailer and shovelling the load into the hopper.
Or, if a specially-built V-shaped bulk delivery trailer is being
used, all that is necessary is to open the sluices in the bottom of
the truck. Also, sampling for grading no longer requires the opening
of sacks. These changes have almost totally eliminated the need for
seasonal labour.
The adoption of bulk handling and storage techniques was more
advanced than combine harvesting in 1968: by that stage, more than
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half the crop - fifty four percent - was already being delivered in
bulk, and by 1977 virtually the entire crop was reaching silos in this
way. {See Figure 2 below.)
2.3 WEEDING TECHNOLOGY
Having planted, the dryland farmer must simply wait for the main
ingredient of succe s - rain. But there are two important ways,
independent of nature, in which he may encourage the growth of his
crop: fertilising and weeding. Both can be done mechanically while
the plants are still small enough to use a tractor without causing
damage, but this is possible later only if the rows have been planted
seven feet or more apart. For weeding, the procedure is simply to
uproot the unwanted growth by ploughing lightly. Early weeding has
for many years been done in this way.
Later weeding on farms where the row width is less than seven feet,
has until recently, had to be done by hand. Hoes must surely be the
most ancient of agricultural implements still in use today in an
unchanged form. And for a good reason: they are very effective. But
they also require long hours of work. In recent years, chemical
weed-sprays have offered a labour-saving alternative to the tradition-
al part-hand, part-mechanical method.
Hand-hoeing needs little description. The work is not as tiring as
hand-reaping and so is generally done by women and children. Nor is
it as urgent. In contrast to reaping which must be done as soon as
the crop is ripe - this often occurs simultaneously on farms in the
same district - hoeing can usually be done when workers become
available and does not need as many workers. Partly for these reas-
ons, most hand-hoeing has been done by the families of permanent farm
workers, living on "white" farms.
Weedicides are usually sprayed onto the soil during, or shortly
after planting by a tractor towing or mounted with a tank and spraying
equipment. Because spraying is not effective against all weeds, it is
normally followed in mid-summer either by hand-hoeing or by part-hand,
part-mechanical hoeing. Hand-hoeing teams employed for this work are
considerably smaller than if the entire weeding operation is done by
hand or part-mechanically.
By comparison to harvesting and delivery, chemical weed control was
not nearly as widespread in 1968. Only fifteen percent of the area
planted with all crops was being sprayed with weed-killers at that
stage. But the pace of advance was quick and by 1981 weed-killers
were being used on roughly ninety five percent of the total crop
surface area. (See Figure 2.)
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Besides technology, the three factors on which employment patterns
appear to depend most are the surface area of farming units, the yield
or output of maize per hectare and wages.
2.4 FARM SIZE AND YIELD
The connection between changes in technology, wages and output per
hectare, and changes in the level of employment needs no explanation.
Between changes in farm size and changes in employment, the link is
not so obvious. Farm enlargements increase potential economies of
scale, i.e. they create the opportunity to lower the average cost of
production. This generally involves either purchasing more or larger
labour-replacing machines, which it would not be profitable to use on
smaller areas of land, or using existing machinery and labour on an
enlarged area. The second of these options is frequently chosen:
farmers are reluctant to retrench permanent workers who have worked
for them for some while but who have become redundant as a result of
mechanisation. However, there are no such personal ties between
farmers and workers employed on other farms. So when additional land
is bought or rented, the workers who were previously employed on that
land are often not re-employed.
Over the thirteen years, the average gross surface area of farming
units in the survey grew by almost seventy five percent from 664 ha in
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1968 to 1,155 ha in 1981. No less than two thirds of the increase
came about in the period 1973-1977. These changes should be seen
against the background of a near-constant total area planted with
maize, and therefore indicate a substantial increase not only in the
size of farms but also in the degree of concentration of ownership or
control. The reasons for this crucial change in the structure of
agriculture require further research.
Despite some sha^p fluctuations in the middle '70s, the trend of
output per hectare was firmly upwards. On average, the expected yield
grew by a little short of six and a quarter per annum, resulting in a
total rise of almost 120 percent between 1968 and 1981. Since then
yields have dropped sharply.
2.5 WAGES
Between 1969 and 1976, data collection by the Department of Agri-
culture shows the average cash-only daily wage of seasonal maize-
harvest workers to have roughly doubled from -39 to -77 cents per day.
The average found in the author's survey was Rl,54 per day in 1981
(R1.64 for weeding). Rather less than half of the workers employed
for this task were paid a daily cash wage. The alternative was to pay
workers a proportion of the crop - generally four or five percent for
hand-harvesters and eight to ten percent of gleanings for gleaners.
In most years this would appear to lead to a considerably higher
effective wage: in 1981, when an all-time record crop was harvested,
hand-harvesters earned on average R4.74 per day on the four farms in
the sample where the crop was still harvested in this way. Gleaner's
wages cannot be calculated accurately, but can be estimated at about
R3.50 per day in 1981 for those paid in a proportion of the crop.
With just two exceptions, only 'internal' seasonal workers, i.e.
the families of permanent workers resident on farms, were paid on a
daily cash basis. Living at home, and with the income of permanent
workers in their households assured, it would have been possible, if
not attractive, for such people to view seasonal wages as no more than
a small supplement to family income. Indeed, at an average of R1.54
per day, one can only imagine that most had in some way to be coerced
into accepting work. What the leverage farmers would have needed was
probably provided by residence: women and children dependent for their
income and shelter on the continued employment on farms of the chief
bread-winners of their, households, would have been in a far weaker
position to negotiate wages or refuse employment than independent
communities living far afield.
As will be shown later, one of the most noticeable features of the
change in employment patterns that accompanied the extensive mechani-
sation of, harvesting, crop delivery and weeding in the Western
Transvaal in the 1970s, was the transfer of seasonal jobs from 'ex-
ternal1 to 'internal* workers. This is particularly striking in the
case of maize harvesting, the largest source of seasonal employment.
In 1968, 'internal' workers occupied only nine percent of such jobs.
By 1981, this had risen to forty eight percent. While mechanisation
itself seems to have taken place for a number of reasons, most of
which are not directly related to the wage differential just describ-
ed, the transfer of seasonal employment from 'external' to 'internal'
workers was greatly facilitated by the growth of capital intensity.
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Without doubt, one of the most important reasons for this transfer was
the lower wages that could be offered to seasonal workers resident on
white farms.
For permanent workers, the average all-inclusive annual wage rose
almost three-fold between 1970 and 1977 - from R220 to R653. The
author's estimate for 1981, based on the same method of calculation,
was R1.777. On a daily basis, the increase was therefore from about
-60 cents to R4,85, between 1970 and 1981. However, caution should be
exercised in relating the estimates of the Department to those of the
author. Other evidence suggests either that the author's estimate for
1981 was above the true average or that the Department's estimates for
1970-1977 and subsequent years were below the true average.
When the rise in the cost-of-living is allowed for, the real wage
increases are seen to be much smaller. For seasonal workers, between
1969 and 1981, it is no more than twenty percent. That is, from -39
cents per day in 1969, the real wage rose to only -47 cents in 1981
(at 1969 prices). The gain for permanent workers was more tangible;
the real wage rate increased from R22O p.a. in 1969 to R338 p.a. in
1977 (at 1970 prices). The author's 1981 estimate, also at 1970
prices, was R564 p.a. Bearing in mind the above qualification, this
represents about a two-and-half-fold real increase. On a daily basis,
the real rise was therefore from about -60 cents in 1970 to Rl,55 in
1981. (See Figures 3 and 4 ) .
Details of the method of estimation and composition of wages are to
be found elsewhere.
3. CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS
3.1 THE LEVEL OF EMPLOYMENT
Between 1968 and 1981 the average number of seasonal workers per
farming unit engaged in harvesting and delivering the maize crop fell
by about fifty percent. For permanent workers, the fall was
restricted to twenty percent. However, when the increase in the
average size of farming units is taken into account so that employment
is measured on a constant (per 1,000 hectares) basis, the decline in
the number of jobs is seen to have been almost seventy percent for
seasonal and fifty percent for permanent workers. Because the total
area planted with maize in the Western Transvaal changed little over
the thirteen years, these estimates give the best indication of the
percentage change in the actual number of workplaces in harvesting and
delivery. (See 'total' trend line in Figure 5.) In addition to the
fall in the number of seasonal workers employed, the average period of
employment fell noticeably, from ten to eight and a half weeks per
farm.
In the other major form of seasonal employment, weeding, the adop-
tion of new techniques also led to a contraction in the number of
jobs. The number of seasonal workplaces per farming unit fell by
between twenty five and thirty percent over the thirteen years. On a
constant (per 1,000 ha of arable land) scale, the contraction turns
out to have been much greater - about sixty percent. As in the case
of harvesting, this gives a reasonable indication of the fall in the
actual level of seasonal weeding employment available in the Western
Transvaal. Also in common with harvesting, the period of sharpest
decline occurred in the mid-'70s - between 1973 and 1977. The average
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duration of seasonal weeding employment also shortened, from about
eight and a half to eight weeks per farm.
The actual number of workers who found seasonal employment in
weeding and/or harvesting cannot be calculated accurately. However,
in the six magisterial districts covered by the survey, it appears to
have been approximately 105,000 in 1968 and 40,000 - 45,000 in 1981.
Although the number of permanent workers per 1,000 ha harvested fell
by nearly fifty percent, because harvesting, delivery and weeding are
only three of the full annual range of activities for which permanent
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workers are required, census data shows the number of permanent farm
workers employed in the region to have fallen much less than
proportionately - from about 30,000 in 1969 to 26,000 in 1978 (the
latest year for which census data is available).
Of the total decline in seasonal employment between 1968 and 1981,
about thirty seven percent can be ascribed to the replacement of hand-
by mechanical-harvesting, about thirty two percent to the adoption of
chemical weed-sprays, about twenty four percent to the reorganisation
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of hand-haryesting prior to the introduction of mechanical harvesting
techniques, about seven percent to the introduction of bulk handling
and storage techniques, and less than one percent to the replacement
of tractor-drawn by self-propelled combines.
3.2 THE COMPOSITION OF EMPLOYMENT
At the start of the period sixty six out of every 100 seasonal
harvest workers came from Bophuthatswana. By the end, no more than
forty four out of every 100 did. All of the balance and more was
taken up by the families of permanent farm workers, whose share of
seasonal harvest employment increased from about ten percent to almost
fifty percent during the thirteen years. People from the Transkei,
Botswana, white towns and "black spots" were also employed, but in
comparatively small numbers.
When the pattern of residence is superimposed on the pattern of
falling harvest employment, it is found that whereas in 1968 workers
drawn from "external" sources, i.e. Bophuthatswana, Transkei, etc.,
could count on about 100 workplaces per 1,000 ha of maize harvested,
by 1981 the number was less than twenty. Even those from "internal"
sources, i.e. who lived on white farms, whose share of employment had
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grown so much, benefitted little in net terms: from ten jobs per 1,000
ha in 1968, the actual number increased only to sixteen in 1981.
Figure 5 illustrates.
Almost all "external" seasonal harvest workers came from rural
communities, and, though few had their homes in "black spots", the
majority lived in areas where people from "black spots" are known to
have been relocated. The data collected does not allow one to
estimate the number of relocated people who found seasonal work on
white farms, but there are several indications that it was small.
Women formed the backbone of almost all seasonal harvesting teams,
and appear always to have done so. Men, on the other hand, made up a
declining, and children a steadily rising, proportion. Whereas in
1968 all but a few teams included men and only thirty percent included
children, thirteen years later only about forty percent had adult male
members as against about sixty five percent which incorporated
children (See Figure 6). Teams from external sources were most likely
to include men, and those recruited internally, children. Children
were most likely to be called on to glean behind a combine, and men to
harvest by hand and handle sacks.
FIGURE 6
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If one were to try to sketch a profile of a typical seasonal harvest-
ing team, at the start of the period when most harvesting was still
that iv-LLL rteve/t 15
done by hand and most delivering in sacks, the team would be compara-
tively large - about fifty strong - would be recruited from a black
rural area - most probably Bophuthatswana - and would consist of men
and women in more or less equal proportions and a few children. In
contrast, at the end of the period, when most harvesting was done
.mechanically and most delivering in bulk, the typical team would be
comparatively small - about half the size it was thirteen years
earlier - would be drawn from the families of permanent farm workers
and would be composed rather more of women than of children with
perhaps a sprinkling of men.
In keeping with mechanisation, the greatest part of these changes
occurred between 1973 and 1977.
For seasonal workers employed to hoe, the picture is noticeably
different. Even in 1968, between sixty and sixty five percent of
workers were recruited from families of permanent workers, and by 1981
this had grown to between seventy and seventy five percent. In terms
of the number of workplaces per 1,000 ha weeded, while places were
available for thirty six internal and twenty two external workers in
1968, in 1981 the respective numbers had dropped to seventeen and six.
(See Figure 7.)
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As in the case of harvesting, almost all external weeding workers
came from rural communities, although, from the mid-'70s, very few
came from localities into which people are known to have been moved in
terms of the state's relocation programme. Again, it was women who
were in the majority in hoeing teams, though throughout the period two
out of every three teams included children. Men played a relatively
small and diminishing role. Almost all children came from white
farms, while most teamp from "outside" sources included men. On
average, hoeing teams were considerably smaller than harvesting teams
in 1968, having about thirty members, but their numbers seem to have
been much less noticeably reduced by the adoption of more capital-
intensive methods: in 1981 the size of the average hoeing team was
still between twenty and twenty five, almost the same as for
harvesting. Once more, the period in which the characteristics of
weeding workers changed most was the middle '70s.
Over the years the likelihood of both harvesting and weeding being
done by the same workers increased steadily. As early as 1968, nearly
sixty percent of harvesting teams shared some workers - mostly
seasonal - in common with weeding teams. By 1981 this had risen as
high as ninety percent. Together with the shift of seasonal jobs from
external to internal workers, this suggests that the contraction of
seasonal employment during the last decade or so has been accompanied
by a considerable increase in what one could call "the degree of
concentration of job occupancy". The consequences of both trends is
that fewer and fewer households are sharing the income generated by
agricultural production.
Except in one respect, little information was collected about the
characteristics of permanent workers. The great majority appear to
have been men who lived with their families on the farm where they
were employed.
At harvest time in 1968, a little more than half operated machines,
while the remainder performed manual work. Surprisingly perhaps, the
proportion of machine operators hardly increased in the following
thirteen years, and in 1981 roughly sixty percent of permanent workers
were machine operators and forty percent manual workers. Mechani-
zation reduced the number of harvesting jobs for both - by between
forty five and fifty percent for machine operators per 1,000 ha, and
by about fifty five percent for manual workers. Once more, most of
this change came about between 1973 and 1977.
One unexpected consequence of mechanisation for permanent workers
was the relationship between mechanisation, wages and family incomes.
Though mechanisation has been associated with an increase in the real
wages of permanent workers, and with an increase in seasonal income
for farm families, it appears to have led to a decline in the income
of families from on-farm sources. The reason for this is that
mechanisation has also been associated with a decrease in the average
number of permanent workers per family, and this has more than offset
the rise in the permanent wage rate and in seasonal income.
Unless mechanisation has also brought with it an increase in mi-
grants' remittances, it has therefore tended to make farm families
worse rather than better off. Income from urban areas has become more
important for black rural families, not only in black rural areas, but
also on white farms.
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4. CAUSES OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
When questioned about their reasons for mechanising harvesting,
farmers mentioned the following factors (in descending order of im-
portance) :
1. labour unabailable
2. combine harvesting quicker
3. labour unreliable
4. combine harvesting cheaper
5. combine harvesting easier to control
6. bulk handling made combine harvesting easier
7. wages became too high
4.1 LABOUR SHORTAGE
From the first, third and seventh of these factors, it appears that
farmers perceived a shortage of reliable labour at wages rate that
they were prepared to pay, as one of the most important reasons for
harvest mechanisation. But complaints of difficulty in finding
workers have been a feature of capitalist agriculture in South Africa
for many years, so this explanation should not simply be accepted at
face value. In particular, in the case of seasonal workers such
complaints should be treated with caution. As has been pointed out in
an analysis of seasonal employment on Californian farms,
"... the farmer's incentives are entirely in the direction
of more intense demand (for harvest-labour) than crop or
climate require. Here is the explanation for the
persistent reports of labour shortage while no crops
spoil. The farmer's demand (for harvest labour) is more
or less as he states it. He can, by the large, provide
some employment for most of the workers he calls for. He
could also harvest the crop with many less. So long as the
cost of recruiting additional labour remains negligible
and the cost of unemployment is borne by the community,
and so long as the piece rate system prevails, the farmer
will continue to demand a larger number of workers for a
shorter period of time in preference7to a small number of
workers for a longer period of time."
Nevertheless, there is a good deal of evidence to support the
farmer's complaints. During the crucial years of the early and middle
1970s, when most mechanisation was taking place, the real wages of
permanent farm workers did rise. (See Figure 3.) At the same time,
permanent employment on farms fell. This combination of events does
suggest that men were more reluctant to take permanent farm jobs.
Also although Figure 2 does not show any increase in the average
wage of seasonal workers, it is likely that such a rise did actually
occur. The reasons for this are both that women and children were
progressively replacing men in seasonal teams, and that an ever-
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increasing number of seasonal workers were employed to glean rather
than harvest by hand. Since it is likely that women and children were
paid less than men, and it is certain that gleaners were paid less
than hand-harvesters, an unchanged average real wage implies that
women and children employed to glean were, in fact, paid more than
previously. So the same combination of events - a rise in real wages
and a fall in employment - can be identified for both permanent and
seasonal workers.
Further support for farmers' complaints is to be found in develop-
ments elsewhere in the economy in the early and middle 1970s. While
real farm wages rose in absolute terms, relative to real wages in
mining, manufacturing and construction - the industrial sectors which
were the main alternative sources of employment for men from rural
areas - they actually fell. And, during this period employment oppor-
tunities in these sectors expanded rapidly. In other words, for men
employed on farms, urban jobs became increasingly attractive. It does
therefore, appear that, to a significant extent, mechanisation on
farms took place in response to an increasing urban labour pull.
4.2 ECONOMIES OF SCALE
The fourth of the farmers' reasons for harvest-mechanisation con-
cerned the relative cheapness of combine-harvesters.
The greater the initial fixed outlay for a particular method of
production, the greater the potential for lowering the average cost by
increasing the level of production. This is often referred to" as
"economies of scale". More capital-intensive techniques, therefore
possess greater potential economies of scale than less capital-intens-
ive techniques. To realise this potential, it is necessary, first, to
have a range of techniques of varying capital-intensity, and second,
that the scale of production be increased sufficiently.
In the case of maize-harvesting in the Western Transvaal, the first
of these conditions was fulfilled in the 1960s, when combine-harvest-
ers became generally available. The degree of fulfilment of the
second condition varied from farm to farm, but was given a
considerable boost in the late '60s and particularly in the early and
middle '70s, both by the rapid increase in the average size of farms
and by the marked, if little unstable, rise in crop yields. In the
survey twenty three percent of the purchases of additional land were
accompanied in the same year, or followed in the next year, by the
purchase of a combine.
When costs are calculated, it is surprising to find that the crit-
ical harvest tonnage above which it was cheaper to use combines was
only 250 tonnes. Only two or three percent of farms in the sample
handled tonnages which were below this in 1976. And even in 1968 when
the average harvest tonnage was considerably smaller, and the relative
cost of hand-harvesting lower, no more than about ten percent of farms
in the sample would have found it cheaper to harvest by hand.
This is a crucial finding because it shows that on all except the
smallest farms, the switch to combine harvesting was merely a question
of time and of a suitable stimulus, from the time that combines first
became generally available. The growing reluctance of men to take
farm jobs and the simultaneous rapid increase in the size of farms in
the first half of the '70s appear to have provided the stimulus but in
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the end it is chiefly to the development of new technology abroad that
harvest mechanisation .should be ascribed. This suggests that the
reduction in farm employment was due mainly to a "rural labour push"
rather than to an "urban labour pull".
4.3 INCREASING FARMERS' CONTROL OVER THE LABOUR PROCESS
There are so many aspects to this complex issue - few of which have
yet been explored - that the following can only be offered as initial
thoughts.
Almost all of the seven main reasons given by farmers for harvest
mechanisation can, in a loose sense, be interpreted as attempts to
increase their •degree of control', in particular, the second and
fifth, i.e. 'combine harvesting quicker1 and 'combine harvesting
easier to control'. In fact, so important did the Marais Commission
rate 'ease of control1 that it argued that profit maximization is
often relegated to a subordinate position:
"Experience has shown that farmers tend with the greatest
eagerness to accept ... a new implement if it offers
possibilities for making the task or life easier for them
... (and are) inclined to think of the economy of the
matter after (they have) decided that the particular
implement is ... the one (they) would like to have."
The many tasks performed by hand which were subsequently taken over
by machines represent only one aspect of control. The composition of
seasonal teams is another. Recall that the size of seasonal teams
shrank considerably. Also, while women were always the mainstay of
seasonal teams, children to a large extent replaced men and residents
of white farms tended to replace residents of black rural areas. Fewer
workers are certainly more readily controllable than many; women and
children less fractious than men; and the families of permanent farm
workers living at or near the site of operations a more accessible and
dependable source of labour than independent communities living far
afield. To this one can add the appreciable shortening of the harvest
period.
Furthermore, while the traditional techniques were still in use,
farmers had no option but to go to black rural areas and negotiate for
the men they wanted - who were not available in sufficient numbers
among the families of permanent workers. With the introduction of
combines and bulk handling, physical strength and stamina were no
longer as important, and the bargaining position of communities in
black rural areas was undercut. This shifted the balance of power
more firmly into the hands of farmers.
However, there is another side to this. Many machine operators who
remain - mostly drivers of combines and heavy duty delivery vehicles -
have acquired new skills, some of which are in demand in urban areas.
Though the "training school", Boskop, in Potchefstroom is regularly
over-booked and most farmers approved of its courses in principle,
many expressed reluctance to send workers employed on their own farms
for training - particularly in the driving and vehicle maintenance
courses - because of the tendency of such workers to leave farms soon
after training. For workers, driver's licences and maintenance skills
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create more than a little leverage. Wage patterns seem to reflect
this. Organising labour - which many farmers expect in the
foreseeable future - may be less difficult in these circumstances.
4.4 THE CUMULATIVE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
The sixth reason given by farmers for the purchase of combines was
that "bulk handling made combine-harvesting easier".
Without bulk delivery and storage system, the manual handling of
90kg sacks would still have remained. This required the presence of
men, who could be recruited in sufficient numbers only from the
"reserves". It was the prior introduction of bulk-handling on most
farms that opened the way for combine-harvesting to phase out seasonal
teams from black rural areas.
To a lesser extent, combine-harvesting in turn played the same
catalytic role in the adoption of chemical weed sprays, though the
process was rather different. In contrast to harvesting, hoeing seems
generally to have been allocated to the families of permanent farm
workers, as a matter of tradition. So there was relatively little
scope to switch labour sources. However, with the spread of combines,
there was a tendency to plant maize in three foot rather than seven
foot rows, although this was more than just harvesting convenience.
Between seven foot rows a tractor can plough lightly, which is the
normal preliminary to hand hoeing. Between three foot rows, this is
no longer possible, and even wielding a hoe is difficult, once the
maize is a foot or two high. So weed sprays applied at or shortly
after planting were a natural complement to the use of combines fitted
with three foot intakes.
While it would be wrong to suggest that there is a simple chain
reaction in the process of technological change, these two examples do
serve to demonstrate the presence of an important cumulative,
interdependent element.
4.5 INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
State policy on farm labour and on the cost of farm inputs in
general, perhaps unexpectedly, does not appear to have been a notable
cause of the technological changes considered here.
In a variety of ways, state policy has long favoured the substitu-
tion of capital for labour on farms. But this does not explain why,
when such policy measures had made machinery cheaper and easier to
purchase in the '50s and '60s when combines first became available,
most farmers only mechanised harvesting in the middle '70s.
The only significant change in state policy on the pricing of
capital goods that occurred during the period being considered was the
tax provision which enabled farmers to write off the entire cost of
new machinery in the year of purchase, thereby reducing both their tax
liability and the cost of new machinery. But this was introduced only
in 1977, by which time the greatest part of mechanisation had already
occurred, as can be seen from Figure 1. Farmers were asked explicitly
about this, but few said it had influenced their decision to purchase
machinery.
What may have been more important was the descent of real interest
rates into the negative range that accompanied the upsurge of infla-
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tion in the middle '70s. In other words, borrowing became so cheap
that it was highly attractive for farmers to raise loans and purchase
land and machinery. This was compounded by the rise in real farm
wages that appears to have occurred at the same time. But both of
these processes were only tenuously connected to changes in institu-
tional factors.
Potentially more important was the state's population relocation
policy, which was i*-* full swing during the 1970s. However, the rural
areas of the Western Transvaal seem to have been less affected than
most. By the '60s labour tenancy had effectively disappeared. Even
the older farmers could remember little about 'woon volk1; the Surplus
Peoples' Project records only a few isntances of black families being
removed from white farms; and, in contrast to most other regions in
the Transvaal, only one of the six magistrial districts in the survey
was covered by an Abolition of Labour Tenancy notice.
In addition, though many 'black spots' were 'cleared1, only a very
small percentage of workers on white farms had their homes in these
areas, as Figure 4 shows. Nor is there any evidence that the
activities of (farm) Labour Control Boards were important. So the
relocation programme appears at most to have been a minor cause of
mechanisation.
Rather, events happened in reverse. To the extent that they have
led to the retrenchment and removal of permanent workers and their
families to black rural areas, farm consolidation and mechanisation
should be seen as an informal, perhaps unintended, element of the
relocation programme.
But, two caveats: first, it is chiefly seasonal workers from black
rural areas not permanent workers resident on white farms who have
been affected by the events described above. And second, though there
is clear evidence that the number of permanent workers on white farms
in the region has fallen, it is not clear how far this has been
accompanied by their and their families' move from white to black
rural areas. Findings presented elsewhere show that at least part of
the decline in permanent farm employment has been absorbed by a
contraction in the average number of permanent workers per family
{living on white farms). This suggests that, instead of whole
households leaving white farms, some of the younger members are now
looking for work in urban areas, while their families - still number-
ing at least one permanent farm worker - remain on their former em-
ployer's farm. Several farmers referred to just such a set of circum-
stances, and the continued rise in the black population of white rural
areas recorded by the 1980 census adds to the evidence. Influx
control does not always appear to immobilise farm workers. Only one
fact emerges for certain: that is the increased dependence of rural
black families on income from urban areas.
5. UNEMPLOYMENT
What happened to the workers who left the farms? The way in which
the research was undertaken did not provide a direct answer. However,
from national and regional wage and employment statistics, it appears
that the fall in farm employment was to some extent compensated for by
a rise in industrial employment.
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For men, the main alternatives to farm work were jobs in mining,
manufacturing and construction. During the economic boom in the first
half of the 1970s, employment and real wages in these industries
increased rapidly. This suggests both that jobs in these sectors
became more attractive and that many men previously employed on farms
were able to find work in urban areas. In the second half of the
'70s, the number of jobs and real wages in these industries rose more
slowly, and actually fe^l in some instances. But during this period,
the number of permanent workers on farms seems to have remained fairly
constant, and even risen slightly. So, many, perhaps most, men who
could no longer find employment in agriculture, or who no longer
wanted it, were probably able to find work elsewhere.
For women employed on farms, on the other hand, the only signif-
icant avenues of alternative employment were in urban domestic service
and in the "informal sector". There are no records of informal
employment and wages, but it is clear that there was no appreciable
increases in either employment or real wages for domestic workers. In
contrast to men, therefore, most women made redundant by technological
change on farms - and they made up the bulk of those whose seasonal
jobs were phased out - would probably have found it difficult to get
other work. For those who relied on seasonal or domestic work on
farms merely to supplement regular income from other family members,
this would have been unfortunate. But for those with no such stable
sources of income, it would have been disastrous. It is women living
in black rural areas who have borne the brunt of technological change
on farms.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Extensive mechanisation and increases in farm size have taken place
on Western Transvaal farms in the last decade and a half. The causes
appear to have been manifold, including periodic labour shortages;
economies of scale; falling real interest rates and rising real wages;
action by farmers to increase their control over the labour process;
the cumulative nature of technological change; and, to a limited
extent, some changes in institutional factors.
Mechanisation has been accompanied by a substantial reduction in
employment, mainly of seasonal workers; by the transfer of seasonal
jobs from workers living in black rural areas to those living on white
farms; and by the replacement of men by women and children in seasonal
teams.
Those on whom the burden of having to find alternative employment
has fallen most heavily are residents of black rural areas. House-
holds which have relied chiefly on female breadwinners are most likely
to have suffered a critical loss of income.
The contraction in permanent farm employment manifested itself
partly in an exodus of black families from white farms and partly in a
decline in the average number of permanent workers per family. Both
are likely to have increased the dependence of black families in white
rural areas on income from urban sources, despite the increase in the
real wages of farm workers that has accompanied mechanisation.
Though mechanisation has probably increased the degree of farmers'
control over the harvesting, delivery and weeding processes, there
may, paradoxically, now be greater potential for labour organisation.
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With hindsight, 1981 was a high-water mark - the culmination of a
decade of favourable weather and rapid output growth in the Western
Transvaal. What the consequences of three years of drought and of the
current marketing crisis in the maize industry will be, remains to be
seen.
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NOTES
1. M.J. de Klerk: "Technological Change and Employment in South
African Agriculture: the Case of Maize Harvesting in the Western
Transvaal, 1968-1981", unpublished M.A. (Economics) thesis,
University of Cape Town, 1983.
2. However, many if not most of the very small farms recorded in
censuses are small-holdings whose chief source of income is not
maize. They would therefore not have formed part of the
population for the author's survey. The degree of their
under-representation may therefore be more apparent than real.
3. Insufficient data was collected to calculate an accurate all-
inclusive wage for seasonal workers. A rough approximation of
the average daily value of food supplied (free) in 1981 is -47
cents.
4. Items included are weekly or monthly cash payments, payment in
form of bags of threshed maize, cash bonuses, food, clothing,
grazing and cultivation rights, medical assistance and paid
leave. The most important omission is housing. The method of
estimation follows that adopted by the Department of Agricul-
ture.
(See M.J. de Klerk: "The Incomes of Farm Workers and Their
Families: A study of Maize Farms in the Western Transvaal",
"Second Carnegie Inquiry into Poverty and Development in Southern
Africa, Conference Paper No. 26, University of Cape Town, 1984).
5. M.J. de Klerk: op. cit.
6. In the 1960s, before the general adoption of combines, farmers
re-organised threshing in a way that saved a considerable amount
of labour without the purchase of additional machinery. This
was done by having one central threshing point instead of moving
the threshing machine from field Lo field. This part of the
calculation is based on time studies conducted by the Department
of Agriculture.
7. L.H. Fisher: The Harvest Labor Market in California, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1953, p,11. Not all
of Fisher's assumptions apply perfectly in the Western Trans-
vaal, but the analogy is close enough to be highly relevant.
8. Republic of South Africa, Commission of Inquiry into Agriculture
(chairman: M.D. Marais) Second Report, Government Printer Pre-
toria, RP 84/1970, p. 165.
9. M.J. de Klerk: op. cit.
